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 Abstract 
This paper measures the effects of food price shocks on both the level of household consumption per 
capita and the instability of the household consumption per capita growth rate in developing countries. 
In this vein, the paper explores the role of aid and remittance inflows in the mitigation of the effects of 
food price shocks in the recipient economies. Using a large sample of developing countries observed 
over the period 1980-2009 and mobilising dynamic panel data specifications, the econometric results 
yield three important findings. First, food price shocks significantly affect both the level and the 
instability of household consumption in highly vulnerable countries. Second, remittance and aid 
inflows significantly dampen the effect of food price shocks in the most vulnerable countries. Third, a 
lower remittance-to-GDP ratio is required in order to fully absorb the effects of food price shocks 
compared to the corresponding aid-to-GDP ratio.  
Keywords: Household consumption; food price shocks; vulnerability; aid; remittances. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent increase in food prices over previous years has raised concerns about the risk of 
the resurgence of undernourishment and hunger around the world, and mainly in poor 
countries. According to the World Bank (2011), global food prices remain high, partly due to 
increasing fuel prices as well as speculative behaviours in the commodity markets, and the 
World Bank’s food price index has once again reached its peak from 2008.1 Moreover, the 
World Bank study stressed that, since June 2010, an additional 44 million people have fallen 
below the $1.25 poverty line as a result of higher food prices. Simulations show that a further 
10% increase in the food price index could lead to 10 million people falling into poverty, and 
a 30% increase could plunge 34 million people into poverty. 
Notwithstanding the recognised damaging effects of food price shocks on poverty and welfare 
in developing food-importing countries, little is known about the role that international capital 
flows can play in dampening the effects of food price shocks. There are several reasons 
behind the interest in the effect of international capital flows, such as foreign aid and 
international migrant remittances.2  
First, developing countries are among the top recipients of official development assistance 
(ODA) and remittances (World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook, 2011) and there 
are existing studies on the countercyclical responsiveness of aid and remittances when 
countries are facing various types of shock, such as exchange rate shocks, natural disasters, 
conflict, oil shocks and financial crises (Ratha, 2005; Yang, 2008; Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 
2007; Mohapatra et al., 2009; Dabla-Norris et al., 2010; David, 2010). 
                                                          
1
 Several factors lie behind the recurrent rises in food prices. These drivers include severe weather events in key 
grain-exporting countries, the broad-based increase in agricultural commodity prices in 2010, which increased 
the competition for land and other inputs; and the link between higher oil prices and biofuels. 
2
 According to the World Bank’s (2011) recent report, “Migration and Remittances Factbook,” the total amount 
of remittances received by developing countries is three times the level of foreign aid, which positions 
remittances among the top external sources of finance in the developing world. 
Second, there are very few papers which examine the role of international capital flows as 
shock absorbers in developing countries (Collier and Dehn, 2001; Chami et al., 2009; 
Craigwell et al., 2010; Combes and Ebeke, 2011). These papers essentially focus on the 
contribution of international capital inflows to macroeconomic stabilisation and coping with 
various types of shock. Collier and Dehn (2001) found that the adverse effects of negative 
export price shocks can be mitigated by broadly contemporaneous increases in aid. Combes 
and Ebeke (2011) showed that remittance inflows help to reduce the destabilising effects of 
natural disasters, agricultural shocks, financial and banking crises, discretionary fiscal policies 
and exchange rate volatility on household consumption per capita. One principal limitation of 
these studies is that they have neglected to compare the effectiveness of remittances and 
foreign aid following a shock, and especially food price shocks in developing countries. This 
issue is important, since there is a fear that foreign aid will be crowded out by the large 
remittance flows observed nowadays.3 Hence, it seems worthwhile to compare the 
effectiveness of these two flows in times of shock before making any judgments.  
Third, there are very few macroeconomic papers which examine the effects of the rise in food 
prices by distinguishing between the potential effects on the most exposed countries (the 
vulnerable ones) and those in which there are not necessarily any negative effects on welfare 
(the less vulnerable ones). One exception is Kamgnia (2011), who addressed the effects of the 
level of food prices on various outcomes (undernourishment, agricultural production, current 
account and government spending), and differentiated the effects according to the level of 
vulnerability to food price shocks in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
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 According to Grabel (2009), skeptics regarding ODA and international aid bureaucracies have embraced 
remittances as part of what Adelman (2003) approvingly calls the new “privatized foreign aid” and what the 
Financial Times (cited in Adelman) terms the “diaspora that fuels development.” In this view, remittances are 
superior to traditional (public) ODA, because they have little to no overhead, they are not subject to misuse by 
state officials and they efficiently and directly meet human needs in developing countries. 
This paper measures the effects of food price shocks on both the level of household 
consumption per capita and the instability of the household consumption per capita growth 
rate in developing countries. In this vein, this paper explores the role of aid and remittance 
inflows in the mitigation of the effects of food price shocks in the recipient economies.  
Using a large sample of developing countries observed over the period 1980-2009 and after 
mobilising dynamic panel data specifications, the econometric results yield three important 
findings. First, food price shocks significantly affect both the level and the instability of 
household consumption in highly vulnerable countries. Based on the previous work of de 
Janvry and Sadoulet (2008), the vulnerability of countries to food price shocks was assessed 
by computing a continuous index which aggregates three main dimensions: the level of 
underdevelopment; high food dependency and a high food import burden. Second, remittance 
and aid inflows significantly dampen the effect of food price shocks in the most vulnerable 
countries. Third, a lower remittance-to-GDP ratio is required in order to fully absorb the 
effects of food price shocks compared to the corresponding aid-to-GDP ratio which is 
required. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 computes the vulnerability index, the food 
price shocks and provides some stylised facts about the vulnerable countries. Section 3 
presents the econometric models and discusses the main results. This paper concludes in 
Section 4 with policy implications. 
  
2. Differential effects of food price shocks according to the level of vulnerability: Some 
stylised facts 
2.1. Identifying vulnerable countries 
According to de Janvry and Sadoulet (2008), countries are vulnerable if they meet the 
following three criteria: (1) high food dependency; (2) a high food import burden and (3) low 
income. 
The first criterion highlights the importance of food in the basket of goods consumed by the 
representative household in a given country. Hence, the larger the share of food items in the 
basket, the harder the household will be hit by an increase in food prices. We approximate 
food dependency by the share of total food imports in the total household consumption. The 
second criterion stresses the strong dependency of a country on the rest of the world, 
including for its supply of food items. Thus, net food-importing countries would be naturally 
more vulnerable to increases in food prices because such increases would cause their current 
account to deteriorate considerably. In this paper, we measure this variable by the ratio of 
food imports to total imports. Finally, the third criterion underlines the capacity of a country 
to constitute food safety nets for domestic consumers, should price shocks be prejudicial to 
them. We measure this capacity by the level of income as approximated by GDP per capita. 
Using the criteria of de Janvry and Sadoulet (2008), we resorted to principal component 
analysis (PCA) in order to build our vulnerability index. Thus, the vulnerability index is a 
combination of the following variables: the ratio of food imports to total household 
consumption; the ratio of total food imports to total imports of goods and services and the 
inverse of the level of GDP per capita. The latter transformation is achieved in order to ensure 
that the level of development is negatively correlated to the degree of vulnerability to food 
price shocks. Finally, the vulnerability index is rescaled so that it ranges between 0 and 10, 
with higher values corresponding to high levels of vulnerability. The calculation of the 
vulnerability index is made for the period 1980-2009. The statistical summary of the PCA is 
presented in the appendices (see Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A.). 
Overall, the first two principal components explain more than 89% of the total variance and 
are significantly correlated with the three main variables used to build the vulnerability index.  
Once the vulnerability index is built, it is useful to see how it is distributed among income 
groups and regions worldwide.  
Figure 1 presents the distribution of vulnerability to price shocks among developing regions. 
The figure shows that the vulnerability index is greater for Sub-Saharan African countries. 
This result is, however, intuitive. In fact, most of these countries are highly dependent on food 
imports and do not have enough income to build safety nets to cope with food price shocks.  
Figure 1 : Vulnerability to food price shocks among developing regions (1980 – 2009) 
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Note : The vulnerability to food price shocks index is the aggregation of three variables: the inverse of GDP per 
capita, the level of food imports as percentage of total imports of goods and the level of food imports as 
percentage of total household final consumption. The principal component analysis has been used as the 
technology of aggregation and the resulting vulnerability index has been rescaled to be between 0 and 10 with 
higher value indicating a strong level of vulnerability.  
In box plots, the lower and upper hinges of each box show the 25th and 75th percentiles of the samples, the line 
in the box indicates the respective medians, and the end-points of whiskers mark next adjacent values.  
EAP: East Asia and Pacific, ECA: Europe and Central Asia, LAC: Latin America and Caribbean, MENA: 
Middle East and North Africa, SA: South Asia, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source : FAO-Stats, World Bank Development Indicators and authors’ construction. 
 
 Looking at income groups, it appears that low-income countries are the most vulnerable, as 
shown in Figure 2. This is due mainly to their inability to build a safety net, such as buffer 
stocks, as underlined above. 
Figure 2 : Vulnerability to food price shocks among income groups (1980 – 2009) 
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Note : LICs: Low Income Countries, LMICs: Lower Middle Income Countries, UMICs: Upper Middle Income 
Countries. 
Source : FAO-Stats, World Bank Development Indicators and authors’ construction. 
 
Overall, the distribution of the vulnerability index among the developing regions and income 
groups shows that low-income countries are the most vulnerable. However, among this group, 
Sub-Saharan African countries are the least secure. 
 
2.2. Computing the food price shock variable 
In order to compute the food price shock variable, we follow the methodology developed by 
Deaton and Miller (1995) and used by Dehn (2000) and Collier and Dehn (2001). 
Specifically, we follow two steps: (1) the food price index is computed following the work of 
Deaton and Miller (1995) and (2) food price shocks are identified using the basic forecast 
model of Collier and Dehn (2001).  
Let tiFP ,  be the food price index in country i  for the year t ; tjP ,  be the world price of food 
item j  at time t  and 
•jiw ,  be the country-specific weighting of the food item at the base year, 
so that we have the following geometrically-weighted structure of the commodity price index: 
∏
=
•
=
6
1
,,
,
j
tjti
jiw
PFP      
where 
•jiw ,  is the value of food item j  in the total value of all commodities 6n =  for the 
constant base period. In this paper, the basket of goods is made up of six commodities: maize; 
milled rice; soybean oil; soybeans; refined sugar and wheat. These commodities are 
considered as the most commonly imported foods in the world (FAO, 2011).4 The weighting 
item is obtained using the following formula: 
∑
=
••
••
•
= 6
1
,
,
,
j
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w      
where 
•,, jiQ  represents the import value of commodity j  at the base year. The year 1995 was 
chosen as the year for which to construct country-specific commodity import weights, 
because it allows the inclusion of the former Soviet Union countries and maximises the 
number of observations of food imports disaggregated by the products in the sample (Burke 
and Leigh, 2010). Global food prices by product are drawn from the International Monetary 
Fund World Economic Outlook database, and the data on food imports are drawn from FAO 
TradeStats online. 
The second step consists of computing the shock variable. Following Collier and Dehn 
(2001), shocks are located by differencing each country’s aggregate real commodity price 
                                                          
4
 FAO (2011). Women in agriculture, closing the gender gap for development: The state of food and agriculture 
report. 
index series in order to make it stationary, removing predictable elements from the stationary 
process and normalising the residuals. The forecasting model used to identify shocks is 
estimated for each country separately, as follows: 
titititi FPFPtFP ,2,21,110, εθθαα ++∆++=∆ −−     
with i denotes the country and t the year. The residuals from the equation above ( ti ,ε) ) are 
normalised by subtracting their mean value and dividing by their standard deviation. Food 
price shocks are the positive observations of the residuals ti ,ε
)
. In other words, the negative 
observations of the normalised residuals ti ,ε
)
 are replaced by zeroes in the database. More 
formally, the food price shock tiS ,  is written as follows:  
]0[1
,,
>= titiS ε
)
 
2.3. Comparing the level of household consumption in times of shock between vulnerable 
and non-vulnerable countries 
This subsection compares the effects of shocks on household consumption between 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable countries. For this purpose, the relative deviation of the real 
household consumption per capita during food price shocks compared to a situation without a 
food price shock is computed.  
Figure 3 depicts the consumption deviation during food price shocks over the period 1980-
2009 according to the level of vulnerability. The x-axis represents the range of vulnerability. 
High refers to a level of vulnerability which exceeds the 75th percentile of the vulnerability 
variable, intermediate refers to a level of vulnerability between the median value and the 75th 
percentile of the vulnerability variable, and low refers to a level of vulnerability below the 
median value of the vulnerability variable in the sample.  
One may notice that the household consumption deviation value is negative for the most 
vulnerable countries, slightly positive for the intermediates and fairly high for the less 
vulnerable countries. In other words, countries which are highly vulnerable exhibit a decrease 
in consumption in times of shock. Those which are less vulnerable enjoy an increase in 
consumption relative to times when no shock has occurred. This is due mainly to the fact that 
most of these countries are net food exporters, and therefore benefit from the increase in 
prices. 
Figure 3: Consumption deviations in time of food price shocks (1980 – 2009) 
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Note : The consumption shock records the relative deviation (in percentage) of the real household consumption 
per capita in the time of food price shocks compared to a situation without a food price shock in each country. 
High: refers to a level of vulnerability exceeding the 75th percentile of the vulnerability variable, Intermediate: 
refers to a level of vulnerability comprising between the median value and the 75th percentile of the vulnerability 
variable, Lows: refers to a level of vulnerability below the median value of the vulnerability variable in the 
sample. 
Source : FAO-Stats, World Bank Development Indicators and authors’ construction. 
 
It is worth seeing how official development assistance (ODA) and remittances respond to 
shocks. Figures 4 and 5 present the deviation in ODA and remittances during food price 
shocks over the period 1980-2009, respectively. 
Figure 4 shows that in times of shock, the most vulnerable countries receive more ODA than 
the other groups of vulnerable countries. The increase in ODA relative to times of an absence 
of shocks stands at 13.6%, while this figure is 8.4% for the “intermediate” and 1.5% for the 
“low” group of countries.  
 
Figure 4: Official Development Assistance deviations in time of food price shocks (1980 – 2009) 
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Note : The foreign aid shock records the relative deviation (in percentage) of the aid-to-GDP ratio in the time of 
food price shocks compared to a situation without a food price shock in each country. 
High: refers to a level of vulnerability exceeding the 75th percentile of the vulnerability variable, Intermediate: 
refers to a level of vulnerability comprising between the median value and the 75th percentile of the vulnerability 
variable, Lows: refers to a level of vulnerability below the median value of the vulnerability variable in the 
sample. 
Source : FAO-Stats, World Bank Development Indicators and authors’ construction. 
 
 
In the same vein, Figure 5 presents the deviation in remittances relative to the absence of 
shocks. This figure suggests that in the event of shocks, the highly vulnerable countries once 
again receive more remittances than the “intermediate” and “low” group of countries. 
However, what is striking in this case is the fact that the increase in the amount received is 
extremely high, standing at 143.9% relative to situation without shocks. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Remittance deviations in time of food price shocks (1980 – 2009) 
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Note : The remittance shock records the relative deviation (in percentage) of the remittance-to-GDP ratio in the 
time of food price shocks compared to a situation without a food price shock in each country. High: refers to a 
level of vulnerability exceeding the 75th percentile of the vulnerability variable, Intermediate: refers to a level of 
vulnerability comprising between the median value and the 75th percentile of the vulnerability variable, Lows: 
refers to a level of vulnerability below the median value of the vulnerability variable in the sample. 
Source : FAO-Stats, World Bank Development Indicators and authors’ construction. 
 
 
3. Do aid and remittances dampen the effect of food price shocks? Econometric models 
The following models are specified in order to test the impact of food price shocks on 
household consumption. 
a) Models of the effects of food price shocks on household consumption 
The first models describe the effect of food price shocks on the level and instability of the real 
household consumption per capita. 
ττττττ εηθβρ ,,1,1,, iiiiii uScc ++++′+= − X    (1) 
ττττττ εηφγσϕσ ,,1,1,, iiiiii uS ++++′+= − Z    (2) 
with τ,ic  and τσ ,i  representing the level of real consumption per capita and the instability of 
the real household consumption per capita growth rate (both expressed in logarithmic terms), 
respectively. X and Z represent the vectors of the control variables. S represents the average 
number of positive food price shocks in each country during each period. There may be a 
concern that households anticipate food price shocks and increase their consumption (if 
households tend to build buffer stocks in order to cope with future shocks). This can lead to 
biased estimates of the effects of food price shocks on consumption. However, this is less 
likely to occur, due to the fact that we are using data averaged over several years. Indeed, this 
overshooting with regard to consumption would be easily observed with high-frequency data 
(especially monthly data).  
iu  represents the country fixed effects and τη  are the period dummies. i  and τ  are the 
country and the non-overlapping sub-periods spanning from 1980 to 2009, respectively,5 
while τε ,i  is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Two hypotheses are tested: 01 =θ  and 01 =φ . In other words, food price shocks, on average, 
have no significant effect on the level of household consumption, except in a context of high 
vulnerability to food price shocks. In order to account for this heterogeneity, models 1 and 2 
are modified to include a nonlinear effect. In formal terms, the following models are 
estimated: 
 τττττττττ εηθθθβρ ,1,31,,2,1,1,, * iiiiiiiii uVulVulSSXcc ++++++′+= −−−  (3) 
τττττττττ εηφφφγφσσ ,1,31,,2,1,1,, * iiiiiiiii uVulVulSSZ ++++++′+= −−−  (4) 
The hypotheses tested are: 01 ≥θ , 02 <θ  and 01 ≤φ , 02 >φ . Models 3 and 4 allow the 
computation of the threshold of vulnerability to food price shocks, beyond which the 
                                                          
5
 For equation 1, data are averaged over eight four-year sub-periods. For equation 2, data are computed over six 
sub-periods of five years each. 
detrimental effects of the shocks on welfare can be observed. From model 3, the vulnerability 
threshold is given as: 
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For the model of the level of household consumption (model 1), the basic set of control 
variables includes the lagged dependent variable, per capita income, the instability of the 
growth in per capita income, the age dependency ratio and the rural population. Positive signs 
are expected for the lagged dependent variable and per capita income. The instability of the 
per capita income is expected to decrease the level of consumption, owing to the 
accumulation of precautionary savings, the decrease in private investment and the 
unavailability of jobs. The age dependency ratio is also expected to lower the level of 
consumption per capita when active people take care of less active individuals. Finally, in 
rural areas which are characterised by a low level of financial development and higher 
poverty rates, the share of consumption in household budgets would be higher. One could 
therefore expect a positive correlation between the rural population and the level of household 
consumption.  
The equation for the instability of household consumption per capita is similar to those 
proposed by Herrera and Vincent (2008), Craigwell et al. (2010) and Combes and Ebeke 
(2011). The variables that are expected to be positively correlated with the instability of 
household consumption are: the instability of the GDP per capita growth rate; government 
size and trade openness. The private credit ratio, the level of economic development and 
financial openness are expected to be negatively correlated with the instability of 
consumption in developing countries.  
b) Models of the stabilising effects of foreign aid and remittances 
Several specifications are adopted in order to test the hypothesis that foreign aid and 
remittances act as food price shock absorbers in the recipient economies. If this hypothesis is 
proven to be true, one would observe a decreasing marginal effect of food price shocks on 
household consumption as remittance and aid inflows rise. This would be the case specifically 
in the most vulnerable countries. In order to test this hypothesis empirically, this paper 
proceeds in two steps. First, the stabilising role of aid and remittances is evaluated using the 
entire sample of countries. We expect a non-significant effect of aid and remittance inflows. 
Next, the sample of countries above the previously computed threshold of vulnerability (Vul*) 
is used to identify the stabilising effects of aid and remittances during food price shocks. As 
previously noted, the outcome variables are the level and the instability of household 
consumption per capita. The same matrix of control variables is also retained, along with the 
identification strategy through system-GMM. In formal terms, this appears as: 
τττττττττ εηθθθβρ ,,6,,5,4,1,, * iiiiiiiii uRRSSXcc ++++++′+= −  (5) 
τττττττττ εηθθθβρ ,,9,,8,7,1,, * iiiiiiiii uAASSXcc ++++++′+= −  (6) 
ττττττττττττ εηθθθθθβρ ,,14,13,,12,,11,10,1,, ** iiiiiiiiiiii uRARSASSXcc ++++++++′+= −  (7) 
For the consumption instability model, the following equations are estimated: 
τττττττττ εηφφφγφσσ ,,6,,5,4,1,, * iiiiiiiii uRRSSZ ++++++′+= −  (8) 
τττττττττ εηφφφγφσσ ,,9,,8,7,1,, * iiiiiiiii uAASSZ ++++++′+= −  (9) 
ττττττττττττ εηφφφφφγφσσ ,,14,13,,12,,11,10,1,, ** iiiiiiiiiiii uRARSASSZ ++++++++′+= −  (10) 
with R and A representing the remittance-to-GDP and aid-to-GDP ratios, respectively.  
When models 5 to 10 are estimated with the restricted sample of countries exhibiting a 
vulnerability index above the critical threshold of Vul* (the most vulnerable countries in the 
sample), the following hypotheses hold: ( ) 0,, 1074 <θθθ ; ( ) 0,,, 121185 >θθθθ  and 
( ) 0,, 1074 >φφφ , ( ) 0,,, 121185 <φφφφ . 
From models 5, 6, 8 and 9, the thresholds of the aid and remittance-to-GDP ratios which 
allow the full absorption of food price shocks in the group of the most vulnerable countries 
are given as: 
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c) Data and methodology 
Data for the control variables are drawn from the World Development Indicators Online, 
except for the financial openness series, which are drawn from Chinn and Ito’s publicly-
available dataset.6 The narrow definition of remittance is employed to record remittances. In 
other words, the remittance variable only records the money sent back by migrants who have  
been residing in the host country for at least one year.7 Remittance data are normalised by 
country GDP series. The foreign aid variable records the total amount of the official 
development assistance (ODA) to developing countries as a percentage of GDP.8 
The estimation of the dynamic panel models 1 to 10 presented above with the use of the OLS 
estimator is inconsistent, since the lagged dependent variables are introduced alongside 
country fixed effects. This bias is a particular concern here owing to the short temporal 
dimension of the dataset used. The system-GMM estimator must therefore be implemented. 
The equations in levels and the equations in first differences are combined in a system and 
estimated with an extended system-GMM estimator which allows for the use of lagged 
differences and lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments (Blundell and Bond, 
1998).9 The GMM estimations control for the endogeneity of some explanatory variables.10  
                                                          
6
 The original series in Chinn and Ito’s (2008) dataset, named KAOPEN, contains both positive and negative 
values between -2 and 2. We added the value of 2 to all of the observations in order to get only positive values. 
7
 For a detailed discussion of the reasons why the narrower definition is suitable in empirical macroeconomic 
studies, see Chami et al. (2009). 
8
 The reader may wonder whether it would not be more appropriate to use disaggregated data on foreign aid, 
such as food aid or agricultural aid, instead of total aid. At least two reasons justify this choice. First, one 
objective of this paper is to compare the effects of remittances and foreign aid in the absorption of food price 
shocks in developing countries. Given that there are no disaggregated data on remittances according to their 
uses, resorting to total aid allows the comparison with remittances. Second, disaggregated data regarding foreign 
aid are relatively scarce and are only available for a few countries over a short period of time. 
9
 This paper uses the one-step system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic 
panel data.  
10
 In all specifications, food price shocks, the lagged vulnerability index, period dummies, initial GDP per capita, 
initial private credit, financial openness, output growth volatility, the rural population ratio and the age 
dependency ratio are taken as strictly exogenous. The other variables are supposed endogenous. 
 
Two specification tests are used to check the validity of the instruments. The first is the 
standard Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. The second test examines the 
hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals.11  
4. Econometric results 
This section begins by discussing the effect of food price shocks on the level and the 
instability of household consumption. Next, the analysis turns to the econometric results of 
the mitigating role played by aid and remittances. 
a) Heterogeneity in the effect of food price shocks 
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of the effect of food price shocks on both the level and the 
instability of household consumption per capita. In each table, the first columns describe the 
impact of food price shocks on the corresponding outcome variable. Regardless of the 
dependent variable that is retained (the level or the instability of consumption), the hypothesis 
that food price shocks do not exert a statistically significant effect on consumption is not 
rejected (column 1 of Tables 1 and 2).12  
Column 2 of Tables 1 and 2 presents the results of the nonlinear effect of food price shocks on 
the two outcomes, depending upon the level of vulnerability to food price shocks. The results 
suggest that food price shocks become statistically significant in explaining both the level and 
the instability of consumption once the models allow for interaction with the vulnerability 
index. In other words, the results reveal a marginal decreasing and significant effect of food 
price shocks on the level of household consumption per capita as the level of vulnerability 
                                                          
11
 To deal with the well-known problem of instrument proliferation raised by the system-GMM estimator 
(Roodman, 2009), the matrix of instruments is collapsed and the number of lags is always limited to a fix order. 
12
 The specification tests associated with the system-GMM specifications give satisfactory results and do not 
invalidate the dynamic panel specifications. 
increases. Regarding the model of consumption instability, the results highlight a marginal 
positive effect of food price shocks on the instability of consumption, which increases with 
the extent of vulnerability.  
Table 1: Food Price Shocks Vulnerability and household consumption, GMM Dynamic 
Panel Data results 
Dependent Variable:  
log real household consumption per capita (1) (2) 
   
Food price shocks -0.000761 0.0201* 
 (0.00452) (0.0109) 
Food price shocks*Vulnerability index  -0.0114** 
  (0.00567) 
Vulnerability index  0.0230 
  (0.0320) 
lag dependent variable 0.704*** 0.698*** 
 (0.155) (0.205) 
log (GDP per capita) 0.370*** 0.385** 
 (0.110) (0.179) 
Age dependency ratio -0.00298** -0.00311* 
 (0.00133) (0.00166) 
Rural population (%) 0.00333 0.00374* 
 (0.00243) (0.00197) 
GDP per capita growth volatility -0.00830*** -0.00539 
 (0.00271) (0.00393) 
Foreign Aid-to-GDP  0.00937* 0.0108* 
 (0.00550) (0.00639) 
Remittances-to-GDP ratio 0.00635 0.00707* 
 (0.00480) (0.00363) 
Intercept -0.579 -0.706 
 (0.543) (0.455) 
   
Observations 446 386 
Number of countries 82 81 
Joint test of  Aid*food price shocks, P-value  0.13 
Vulnerability index threshold  1.75 
Percentage of countries concerned  53% 
Arellano-Bond Test of AR(1) P-value 0.03 0.05 
Arellano-Bond Test of AR(2) P-value 0.32 0.42 
Hansen OID test, P-value 0.2 0.1 
Number of Instruments 19 27 
Notes: The estimation method is the one-step System-GMM. Robust T-statistics are below the 
coefficients. Data are averaged over eight nonoverlapping 4-year periods between 1980 and 
2009. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Table 2: Food price shocks, vulnerability and the instability of household consumption 
Dependent variable:       
log of sd of real household consumption per capita growth (1) (2) 
      
Food price shocks 0.105 -0.156 
 (1.429) (-1.184) 
Food price shocks*Vulnerability  0.0954** 
  (2.141) 
Vulnerability to food price shocks  -0.129 
  (-0.987) 
lag of dependent variable 0.208** 0.113 
 (2.324) (1.030) 
GDP per capita growth volatility 0.489*** 0.453*** 
 (7.877) (6.813) 
Government final consumption ratio 0.00258 0.0448* 
 (0.119) (1.727) 
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.0672 -0.0669 
 (-1.327) (-0.719) 
Initial private credit-to-GDP ratio -0.00429** -0.00542** 
 (-2.469) (-2.236) 
Trade openness 0.00633*** 0.00568* 
 (3.800) (1.759) 
Financial openness index -0.322 -0.509 
 (-1.126) (-1.450) 
Financial openness ² 0.0489 0.0905 
 (0.867) (1.332) 
Intercept 0.892** 0.965 
 (2.156) (1.571) 
   
Observations 367 330 
Number of countries 90 89 
Joint significance of food price shocks coeff.,P-value  0.087 
Threshold level of the vulnerability index  1.64 
Number of countries above the threshold  52 
Percentage of countries above the threshold  58% 
AR(1), P-value 0.000 0.000 
AR(2), P-value 0.672 0.539 
Hansen OID, P-value 0.219 0.157 
Nb of instruments 22 26 
Notes: The estimation method is the one-step System-GMM. Time effects are included in all 
the regressions. Robust T-statistics are below the coefficients. Instability is the 5-year standard 
deviation of the growth rate of the real household consumption per capita. Data are averaged 
over six nonoverlapping 5-year periods between 1980 and 2009. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
From the results presented in column 2 of Tables 1 and 2, one can compute the threshold of 
vulnerability to food price shocks beyond which their effect becomes critical for household 
consumption. The results of Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the values of these thresholds do not 
differ between the two tables. Indeed, the threshold of the vulnerability index stands at 1.75 
(Table 1) and 1.64 (Table 2). The percentage of countries above this threshold stands between 
53% and 58%. This suggests that countries that are located precisely above the median value 
of the vulnerability index are particularly concerned by the damaging consequences of food 
price shocks on consumption. For the rest of the countries in the sample (those which are non-
vulnerable and especially those with a vulnerability index close to 0), food price shocks are 
likely to increase the level of household consumption, but not necessarily its instability 
(according to the value and the significance of the coefficient associated with the additive 
term of food price shocks in Tables 1 and 2). 
To sum up, the preliminary econometric investigations highlight the heterogeneity in the 
response of household consumption to food price shocks, which depends upon the extent of 
the country’s vulnerability to food price shocks. The next task consists of examining the role 
played by foreign aid and remittance inflows in absorbing food price shocks.  
b) The mitigating role of aid and remittance inflows 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the econometric specifications, allowing a nonlinear 
effect of food price shocks conditional on the level of foreign aid and remittance inflows. For 
each dependent variable, the econometric models are first estimated using the whole sample 
(columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 3 and columns 1 and 4 of Table 4). As expected, when the entire 
sample of countries (a mix of vulnerable and non-vulnerable countries) is used, aid and 
remittances have no statistically significant effect in dampening the impact of food price 
shocks, except in the model of the level of household consumption. However, this 
 Table 3: Remittances, Foreign Aid, Food prices shocks and household consumption, GMM Dynamic Panel Data results 
Dependent Variable: log real household consumption per capita Full sample Vul>median Full sample Vul>median Full sample Vul>median 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 
 
    
Food price shocks -0.0118 -0.0237** -0.00401 -0.0395** -0.00696 -0.0543** 
 (0.00777) (0.0110) (0.00682) (0.0183) (0.0110) (0.0239) 
Food price shocks*Remittance-to-GDP ratio 0.00495** 0.00531***   0.00229 0.00446* 
 (0.00218) (0.00178)   (0.00210) (0.00251) 
Food price shocks*Aid-to-GDP ratio   0.000457 0.00304** 0.000300 0.00340** 
 
 
 (0.000819) (0.00137) (0.000898) (0.00155) 
Remittance-to-GDP ratio 0.00258 -0.000716   0.00411 -0.000161 
 (0.00349) (0.00354)   (0.00338) (0.00291) 
Aid-to-GDP ratio   
-0.00117 -0.00507 0.00373 -0.00395 
   (0.00341) (0.00378) (0.00503) (0.00407) 
lag dependent variable 0.592*** 0.491*** 0.488*** 0.521*** 0.474*** 0.495*** 
 (0.151) (0.138) (0.0995) (0.129) (0.115) (0.143) 
log (GDP per capita) 0.440*** 0.517*** 0.555*** 0.514*** 0.528*** 0.485*** 
 (0.100) (0.126) (0.0813) (0.115) (0.0916) (0.141) 
Total population of 65 years old (%) 0.0132*** 0.0176 0.00806** 0.0107 0.0128*** 0.0192* 
 (0.00327) (0.0109) (0.00378) (0.0104) (0.00362) (0.0115) 
Rural population (%) 0.00300 0.00276 0.00353 0.00333* 0.00142 0.00146 
 (0.00266) (0.00284) (0.00224) (0.00200) (0.00242) (0.00265) 
GDP per capita growth volatility -0.00624** -0.00364 -0.00737** -0.00435 -0.00553** -0.00478 
 (0.00255) (0.00279) (0.00316) (0.00323) (0.00240) (0.00298) 
Intercept -0.552 -0.414 -0.661 -0.536 -0.332 -0.116 
 (0.586) (0.652) (0.460) (0.414) (0.540) (0.608) 
 
 
 
    
Table 3 (continued) Full sample Vul>median Full sample Vul>median Full sample Vul>median 
Observations 455 213 524 254 446 211 
Number of countries 83 54 92 64 82 53 
Joint test of shocks, shocks*remittances, P-value  0.01  0.07 
 
0.09 
Wald test of shocks*Aid= shocks*remittances, P-value     
 0.68 
Remittance ratio required for a full absorption of food price shocks  4.45%   
  
Aid ratio required for a full absorption of food price shocks  
  13% 
  
Number of countries concerned   16  15 
  
Percentage of of countries concerned   30%  24% 
  
Arellano-Bond Test of AR(1), P-value 0.025 0.083 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.105 
Arellano-Bond Test of AR(2), P-value 0.049 0.112 0.16 0.239 0.25 0.112 
Hansen OID test, P-value 0.06 0.46 0.02 0.34 0.02 0.36 
Number of Instruments 16 16 22 22 26 26 
Notes: The estimation method is the one-step System-GMM. Robust T-statistics are below the coefficients. Data are averaged over eight nonoverlapping 4-year 
periods between 1980 and 2009. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
specification should be taken with a pinch of salt, given that the GMM specification tests are 
not satisfactory (column 1 of Table 3 and column 1 of Table 4).  
The next task consists of estimating the models with the restricted sample of vulnerable 
countries, and especially the sample of countries with a vulnerability index above the median 
value of the variable.  
The results in Table 3 suggest that when countries exhibit a degree of vulnerability above the 
sample median, remittance and foreign aid inflows have a strong dampening effect on the 
negative impact of food price shocks on the level of household consumption (columns 2, 4 
and 6). Indeed, as expected, the coefficient of the additive term of food price shocks is 
negative and statistically significant, whereas the coefficients of the interaction between 
shocks and aid and remittance inflows are positive and significant. The results also highlight 
the fact that the remittance and aid-to-GDP ratios required for full absorption of the effects of 
food price shocks on the level of household consumption are 5% and 13%, respectively. For 
the remittance threshold, approximately 30% of countries are concerned. For the aid-to-GDP 
threshold, 24% of countries are concerned. This result reveals that a comparatively low ratio 
of remittances is needed in order to cope with food price shocks. 
Regarding the model of consumption instability, the results of Table 4 suggest that when 
countries exhibit a vulnerability index above the sample median, foreign aid inflows have a 
powerful dampening effect on the negative impact of food price shocks on the instability of 
the household consumption growth rate (columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Table 4). For remittance 
inflows, countries must be highly vulnerable (above the 75th percentile of the distribution of 
the vulnerability index) in order to identify a significant stabilising effect of remittance 
inflows (columns 3 and 8). In other words, the instability of household consumption is 
affected to a lesser extent by food price shocks thanks to remittance inflows in countries that 
 Table 4: Remittances, aid, food price shocks and consumption instability 
Dependent variable:   Full sample Vul>median Vul>75th per.   Full sample Vul>median Vul>75th per.   Vul>median Vul>75th per. 
log of sd of real household consumption per capita growth (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
                     
Food price shocks 0.114 0.367** 0.818***  0.108 0.461** 0.614***  0.736** 0.991*** 
 (-1.023) (-2.119) (-2.868)  (-1.147) (-2.461) (2.722)  (-2.492) (-3.300) 
Food price shocks*Remittance-to-GDP ratio 0.000832 -0.0132 -0.0915**      -0.0198 -0.0504* 
 (-0.0901) (-1.010) (-2.309)      (-1.222) (-1.851) 
Food price shocks*Aid-to-GDP ratio     -0.00519 -0.0167** -0.0213**  -0.0254*** -0.0243** 
     (-0.570) (-2.192) (-2.306)  (-2.815) (-2.506) 
Remittance-to-GDP ratio -0.0473** -0.0456* -0.0189      -0.00864 -0.0273 
 (-2.379) (-1.660) (-0.497)      (-0.193) (-0.989) 
Aid-to-GDP ratio     0.0346 0.0317 0.0344  0.0477* 0.0480*** 
     (-1.576) (-1.596) (1.104)  (-1.762) (-2.690) 
lag of dependent variable 0.0698 -0.0173 -0.0284  0.153* 0.164 0.384*  0.211 0.294* 
 (-0.692) (-0.108) (-0.116)  (-1.889) (-0.992) (1.701)  (-1.110) (-1.787) 
GDP per capita growth volatility 0.479*** 0.298*** 0.257*  0.453*** 0.332*** 0.278  0.337*** 0.377*** 
 (-7.386) (-4.580) (-1.905)  (-8.156) (-4.573) (1.610)  (-4.801) (-3.349) 
Government final consumption ratio 0.0506 0.0671 0.108  0.0107 0.0494 0.0377**  0.0318 0.0493** 
 (-1.378) (-1.572) (-1.350)  (-0.466) (-1.174) (2.018)  (-0.724) (-2.052) 
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.128 -0.318 -0.550*  0.0129 -0.128 -0.173  -0.142 -0.225 
 (-1.212) (-1.434) (-1.849)  (-0.122) (-0.856) (-1.203)  (-0.787) (-0.892) 
Initial private credit-to-GDP ratio -0.00409 0.00157 0.0105  -0.00377** -0.00806** -0.00292  0.00191 -0.0014 
 (-1.232) (-0.291) (-0.883)  (-2.222) (-2.311) (-0.713)  (-0.335) (-0.146) 
Trade openness 0.00588 0.0119* 0.0168**  0.00476*** 0.00375 0.00432  0.00562 0.00852 
 (-0.960) (-1.725) (-1.981)  (-3.537) (-1.368) (1.295)  (-1.148) (-1.409) 
           
Table 4 (continued)           
Dependent variable:   Full sample Vul>median Vul>75th per.   Full sample Vul>median Vul>75th per.   Vul>median Vul>75th per. 
log of sd of real household consumption per capita growth (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Financial openness index -0.148 -0.433 -1.103  -0.142 -0.148 -0.0980  -0.287 0.0788 
 (-0.487) (-0.910) (-1.271)  (-0.869) (-0.552) (-0.249)  (-0.974) (-0.219) 
Financial openness ² 0.0134 0.0879 0.269  0.0241 0.0474 0.0339  0.0888 -0.0131 
 (-0.220) (-0.849) (-1.386)  (-0.701) (-0.850) (0.329)  (-1.476) (-0.135) 
Intercept 0.793 1.341* 1.785  0.14 0.173 -0.0891  -0.223 -0.731 
 (-1.587) (-1.667) (-1.380)  (-0.176) (-0.161) (-0.0704)  (-0.199) (-0.640) 
           
Observations 328 155 92   360 171 103   155 92 
Number of countries 86 51 38  90 54 40  51 38 
Joint significance of food price shocks coeff., P-value 0.488 0.084 0.015  0.514 0.048 0.024  0.046 0.009 
Remittance ratio required for a full absorption of the shock  9%        
Aid ratio required for a full absorption of the shock     27.5% 29%    
Number of countries above the threshold   5   1 2    
Percentage of countries above the threshold   13%   2% 5%    
AR(1), P-value 0 0.03 0.089  0 0.022 0.042  0.031 0.15 
AR(2), P-value 0.672 0.435 0.681  0.656 0.784 0.765  0.714 0.55 
Hansen OID, P-value 0.035 0.279 0.488  0.627 0.787 0.416  0.647 0.837 
Nb of instruments 30 30 30   24 24 24   32 32 
Notes: The estimation method is the one-step System-GMM. Time effects are included in all the regressions. Robust T-statistics are below the coefficients. Instability is the 5-year standard deviation 
of the growth rate of the real household consumption per capita. Data are averaged over six nonoverlapping 5-year periods between 1980 and 2009. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
are highly exposed to food price shocks. A tentative explanation for this result could be that 
countries differ in their use of remittances according to their location on the distribution of the 
vulnerability index. Remittances may be more likely to be devoted to the financing of 
consumption in countries that are highly dependent upon food imports compared to other 
countries. This argument is also supported by the fact that the destabilising effect of food 
price shocks increases significantly when the sample is restricted to the countries above the 
75th percentile of the vulnerability index. Indeed, the coefficient associated with the food price 
shock variable introduced additively increases from 0.37 to 0.82 between columns 2 and 3, 
and from 0.74 to 1 between columns 7 and 8 of Table 4. 
The results also highlight that the remittance and aid-to-GDP ratios required for full 
absorption of the effects of food price shocks in countries located above the 75th percentile of 
the vulnerability index are approximately 9% and 29%, respectively. For the remittance 
threshold, around 13% of countries are concerned. The percentage decreases to only 5% for 
the corresponding aid threshold.13 As has been shown previously, a comparatively low ratio of 
remittances is in fact necessary in order to cope with food price shocks.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The dramatic increase in food prices over previous years has revived an increasing concern 
about food security, mainly for the most vulnerable countries. This paper examines the impact 
of food price shocks on household consumption according to each country’s level of 
vulnerability to food price shocks. It also addresses the ability of foreign aid and remittances 
to mitigate the impact of food price shocks.  
                                                          
13
 Indeed, Mozambique and Nicaragua are the sole countries for which the average aid-to-GDP ratio is above the 
threshold of 29% for the period 1980-2009. 
Based on a large sample of developing countries, observed over the period 1980-2009, two 
main results are derived. First, food price shocks significantly affect both the level and the 
instability of household consumption, especially in the most vulnerable countries. In the 
context of a high level of vulnerability, food price shocks reduce the level of real household 
consumption per capita, while fostering the instability of household consumption. Second, the 
results highlight that when countries exhibit a high degree of vulnerability, remittance and 
foreign aid inflows have a strong dampening effect on the impact of food price shocks on 
household consumption. Finally, the results suggest that a lower remittance-to-GDP ratio is 
required in order to fully absorb the damaging effects of food price shocks on consumption 
compared to what is required in terms of foreign aid.  
This paper has clear policy implications. The results outlined above suggest that remittances 
and aid should be increased in order to mitigate the dramatic effects of food price shocks in 
the most vulnerable countries. However, this could be a short-term policy. Indeed, in the long 
term, one should address the issue of vulnerability. One way in which to deal with this 
specific issue is to invest massively in agriculture, while increasing the level of 
diversification. Foreign aid and remittances could be at the heart of this process. 
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APPENDIX A: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
Table A1 :Eigen value and cumulative relative frequencies  
Principal component Eigen Values Proportion Cumulative relative frequencies 
1 1.61 0.53 0.53 
2 1.07 0.35 0.89 
3 0.314 0.1 1 
        
 
Table A2: Eigen Vectors 
Variable P1 P2 P3 
Food imports-to-household consumption  0.69 -0.26 0.03 
Food imports-to-total imports  0.71 0.1 0.14 
10,000/GDP per capita  0.05 0.94 0.13 
Note : ( ) ( ) 21 89.0/35.089.0/53.0 PPVuli ×+×=  
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND LIST OF COUNTRIES 
 
 
TableB2 : Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the model of consumption instability 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Instability of real household consumption per capita growth (log) 476 1.45 0.91 -1.69 5.09 
Number of food price shocks 816 1.66 1.11 0 4 
Remittance-to-GDP ratio 609 3.09 5.29 0 37.21 
Aid-to-GDP ratio 718 8.61 10.87 -0.12 77.16 
Instability of real GDP per capita growth rate (log) 734 1.09 0.81 -1.38 3.76 
Government consumption-to-GDP 697 15.78 7.10 2.34 53.41 
Initial real GDP per capita (log) 704 6.83 1.09 4.13 9.00 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio 654 26.42 22.54 0 139.83 
Trade openness 721 76.55 39.33 0.67 310.58 
Financial openness 705 1.62 1.29 0.16 4.48 
            
 
Table B1: Descriptive statistics of variables included in the model of consumption    
Variables Obs Mean Sd Dev Min Max 
       
log (Household Consumption per capita) 674 6.635 1.009 4.353 8.786 
Number of price shocks 1088 1.347 1.036 0 4 
Vulnerability index 666 2.129 1.286 0.0516 10 
Aid-to-GDP  966 8.438 11.04 -0.128 103 
Remittance-to-GDP ratio 806 3.235 5.480 0 42.21 
log (GDP per capita) 979 6.863 1.097 4.381 9.199 
Total population of 65 years old (%) 1046 4.951 3.045 1.848 17.38 
GDP per capita growth volatility 953 3.644 4.049 0.0873 47.40 
Rural population-to-total population 1086 56.40 20.57 6.510 95.43 
Age dependency ratio 1046 75.69 17.92 38.77 116.01 
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Table B3 : Countries by level of vulnerability  
Vul<Median Median<=Vul<Vul75 Vul>Vul75 
Argentina Latvia Albania Benin 
Azerbaijan Lithuania Algeria Burkina Faso 
Belarus Malaysia Armenia Cape Verde 
Bolivia Mauritius Belize Chad 
Botswana Mexico Central African Republic Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Brazil Morocco Congo, Dem. Rep. Eritrea 
Bulgaria Namibia Cote d'Ivoire Ethiopia 
Cambodia Panama Guinea Gambia, The 
Cameroon Paraguay Jordan Lao PDR 
Chile Peru Kyrgyz Republic Lesotho 
China Philippines Lebanon Malawi 
Colombia Poland Madagascar Maldives 
Costa Rica Romania Mauritania Mali 
Croatia Russia Nicaragua Mozambique 
Cuba Serbia Pakistan Senegal 
Dominican Rep. South Africa Papua New Guinea St Vincent and the Grenadines 
Ecuador Thailand Sudan Tajikistan 
El Salvador Tunisia Swaziland Timor-Leste 
Gabon Turkey Syrian Arab Rep. Togo 
Guatemala Ukraine Tanzania Yemen, Rep. 
Honduras Uruguay Uganda 
 
India Venezuela, RB  
 
Indonesia Vietnam  
 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Zambia  
 
Kazakhstan   
 
Kenya   
 
Note: Vul refers to the country specific mean of vulnerability, Median is the median of the distribution of 
countries according to their level of vulnerability, and Vul75 is the 75 percentile of the distribution of the 
vulnerability index. 
 
 
 
 
